International Environment Threats through Transboundary Acidification: Nation-Level Positions within the International Environmental Structure by Sprinz, D.
International Environment Threats 
through Transboundary 
Acidification: Nation-Level 
Positions within the International 
Environmental Structure
Sprinz, D.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-90-013
March 1990 

Sprinz, D. (1990) International Environment Threats through Transboundary Acidification: Nation-Level Positions within the 
International Environmental Structure. IIASA Working Paper. WP-90-013 Copyright © 1990 by the author(s). 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3438/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  
International Environment Threats through 
Transboundary Acidification: 
Nation-Level Positions within the 
International Environmental Structure 
Detlej Sprinz 
March 1990 
W P-90-013 
I n t e r n a t ~ o n a l  l n s t ~ t u t e  
for Applted Systems Analys~s 
International Environment Threats through 
Transboundary Acidification: 
Nation-Level Positions within the 
International Environmental Structure 
Detlef Sprint 
March 1990 
W P-90-013 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis and have received only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute 
or of its National Member Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
Author 
Detlef Sprinz is currently associated with the Department of Political Science, The 
University of Michigan, 5602 Haven Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045, USA. 
Preface 
Detlef Sprinz was a member of the Transboundary Air Pollution Project as part of 
the 1989 Young Scientists Summer Program at IIASA. In this paper, he uses the Regional 
Acidification Information and Simulation (RAINS) model in a rather unique way: to  show 
which European nations are in advantageous or disadvantageous positions with respect to 
acidic deposition, and how this could affect their perspective for international negotia- 
tions. 
R.W. Shaw 
Leader 
Transboundary Air Pollution Project 
B.R. Doos 
Leader 
Environment Program 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. i 
. . Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 1 1  
........................................................................................................................... Introduction 1 
....... 1 . The International Structure and Preferences for International Environmental Regulation 1 
...................... 2 . The Regional Acidification and Information And Simulation Model (RAINS) 2 
.......... 3 . Indicators of the Position of States Within the International Environmental Structure 3 
3.1 Description of the Scenarios Considered ................................................................. 3 
3.2 The Deposition Perspective ................................................................................... 6 
3.3 The International 'Trade" Perspective ................................................................ 10 
3.4 The International Emission Perspective ............................................................... 12 
4 . Theoretical Implications of the Findings and an Agenda for Future Research ................. ..... 14 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 18 
Tables .................................................................................................................................. 23 
Figures ................................................................................................................................. 32 
Detlef Sprinz 
Abstract 
Cross-national environmental pollution can be understood as a limitation to national 
welfare caused by actors beyond the jurisdiction of a state. Both, the international 
environmental structure as well as domestic variables may account for the variation found 
across states with respect to international environmental regulation. The author wishes to 
explain why the European member states of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) subscribe to or refrain from the international regulation of the Long Range 
Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP), which is commonly called "acid rain." 
This study focuses on the question: Is there an international environmental structure 
(like international emission/deposition patterns) for sulfuric acidification in Europe which 
might influence the extent of international environmental regulation? Three perspectives 
on the international environmental structure are presented: 1. The deposition perspective: 
Each country is treated as a unit which receives pollutants from other countries. 2. The 
international trade perspective: Each country is analyzed as a participant in unwanted 
international "trade" of environmental pollutants. 3. The emission perspective: Each 
country is viewed as a unit which threatens other nations via exported emissions. The 
author used the results generated by the Regional Acidification and N f o r m a  tion 
Simulation model (RAINS) of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) to test hypotheses related to each of these perspectives. 
The analyses demonstrate that Central Europe is in a disadvantageous position 
from a deposition perspective. Furthermore, some East European countries are strongly 
externalizing their environmental problems because they are net exporters of pollutants; 
from an emission perspective it can be show that some East European countries are likely to 
be exposed to diplomatic pressure since their exported emissions pose substantial threats 
abroad. In conclusion, states find themselves in grossly unequal positions with respect to 
internationally caused sulfuric acidification. The paper concludes with a theoretical 
interpretation of the findings and points to options for future research. 
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Introduction 
A brief overview of the theoretical rational of the article will be presented in the first 
section which is followed by a review of the simulation model used for data generation. In 
section 3, which forms the core of the paper, indicators for the study of the international 
environmental problem under investigation are presented in conjunction with the empirical 
findings. Section 4 looks at the theoretical implications of our findings, points to the 
shortcomings of this research, and outlines future paths for theory development. 
1. The International Structure and Preferences for International Environmental Regulation 
Global environmental problems redistribute national welfare by imposing net costs on some 
states while other states receive net benefits. As has been argued with the "billiard ball" 
model with respect to the balance of power (Morgenthau/T'hompson 19851, states respond to 
"problem pressure" caused by foreign actors. Status quo policies of states with regard to 
pollution may be considered to serve as the reference case. A state's policies are geared 
towards improving its position relative to the status quo; i.e., states want to reduce their 
long-term "vulnerability" (Keohane/Nye 1977) and use domestic policies, or they redesign 
their foreign environmental policy for this purpose (Prittwitz 1984). In conclusion, states 
can be conceptualized as unitary, utility-maximizing actors (Bueno De Mesquita 1981) 
which react to external stimuli. 
Although all states are formally sovereign and equal, international air exchange 
leaves some states in a disproportionately disadvantageous position, while other states 
experience substantial net benefits. The author would like to demonstrate the degree of 
ineaualitv amone states created bv the international environmental structure (Waltz 1979, 
Organski/Kugler 1980). 
The analysis to follow is part of a research design which specifies the dual 
determinants of national participation in, or abstention from, international environmental 
regulation (see Figure 1). For some countries, the international structure creates potential 
net benefits to be gained from international environmental regulation and vice versa. 
Therefore, the international structure will influence national positions in international 
negotiations on the environment. In addition, a disadvantageous position within the 
international environmental structure is likely to lead to more stringent domestic 
regulation. This hypothesis is likely to hold, since domestic policies may be entertained to 
ameliorate part of the intemational environmental problem. Both, perceived benefits from 
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international regulation and the extent of domestic regulation are positively linked to an 
increased likelihood that nations will participate in international environmental 
agreements. 
This study shows that the geographical location of a country (like an "upwind" or a 
"downwind" position) is an oversimplified summary of a state's position within the 
international environmental structure. Indeed, the Regional Acidification and 
INformation and Simulation model (RAINS) developed by the Transboundary Air 
- 
Pollution Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(Laxenburg/Austria) facilitates a rigorous analysis of interdependence with respect to the 
intercountry exchange of po1lutants.l 
2. The Regional Acidification and Information and Simulation Model (RAINS) 
Since its creation by the (military) superpowers in the early 1970s, the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has developed tools for the solution of 
problems in a diverse set of fields. The common goal has been to form scientific tools for 
application in different political systems and thereby to aid policy makers in increasing 
the set of feasible solutions for problems like transboundary acidification. The 
Transboundary Air Pollution Project (TAP, formerly the Acid Rain Project) has developed 
the simulation model RAINS since 1984, and it is semi-officially accepted by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) for scientific consulting purposes related 
to the 1979 Convention on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (LRTAP) (UNECE 
1989, 1988). The implicit goal for RAINS was to separate (1) the problem of information 
generation from (2) the problem of arriving at politically acceptable solutions for the 
member states of the UNECE. 
The model consists of modules which capture the emission, the transport, and the 
deposition of sulphur and nitrogen oxides.2 In addition, impact modules for (1) forest soil 
acidification in Europe, (2) lake acidification in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and for (3) 
direct forest impacts in Europe have been developed. A cost module for the study of 
abatement schemes is available for sulphur oxides and allows to design cost-minimizing 
clean-up strategies in conjunction with an optimization algorithm. Besides working as a 
synthesizer of many natural science disciplines and environmental economics, the model 
stands out for allowing to simulate scenarios ("front end" changes by the user) as well as to 
run in an optimization mode. The cost optimization modules allows international 
The analysis of the atmospheric transport of nitrogen is also included in RAINS. The author will 
undertake a complementing analysis once the relevant databases are updated and tested. 
The best summary to date is the article by Alcamo et a1 (1988) and the forthcoming book by 
Alcamo et al. 
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deposition reduction goals to be achieved at minimum total cost to the UNECE countries. 
Alternatively, given amounts of money can be optimized with respect to their impact on 
deposition.3 
The RAINS model will include an optimization module for the simultaneous 
reduction of sulphur and nitrogen oxides in the near future. In conclusion, RAINS is currently 
the best software for the study of acidification in Europe, and its output is useful for the 
political analysis of an important environmental problem. 
3. Indicators of the Position of States Within the International Environmental Structure 
With respect to international air pollution exchange, I suggest three major perspectives. 
Firstly, each nation can be looked at as a receptor of acid deposition, the origin of which 
are domestic and foreign ("deposition perspective"). Second, one may look at nations as 
(involuntarily) "trading" air pollutants: Some nations are net importers of pollution while 
other nations have the benefit of being in a net exporter position ("international trade 
perspective"). Third, nations are able to look at their own emissions as potential threats to 
domestic or foreign ecosystems ("emission perspective"). Each perspective will be 
developed in more detail below. Throughout the analysis we only take those sulphur 
pollutants into account which can be attributed to political actors, i.e., we omit 
( i )  "background contributions", which cannot be empirically attributed to any  
political entity, as well as 
( i i )  emissions which are not deposited in the member states of the Cooperative 
Programme for the Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range 
Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), which is the UN- 
supported monitoring program for acidification in Europe. 
3.1 Description of the Scenarios Considered 
For theoretical reasons I assume that states wish to maximize utilitv. Then, a government 
is expected to undertake only those policies from which it expects to gain positive returns, 
since scarce resources are allocated in the political process. In the case of the international 
transport of acidic pollutants (reviewed in Alcamo et a1 forthcoming, ch.2), we would 
expect governments to pursue the following goals: 
The optimization module focuses on international cost efficiency. This does not mean, that the 
sets of solutions are acceptable to policy makers. 
(i ) to minimize stress to domestic ecosystems, 
( i i )  to offset international interdependence, as evidenced by foreign caused 
depositions in one's own country, by depositing domestic emissions abroad 
(i.e., externalizing an environmental problem), and 
( i i i )  to avoid to be diplomatically targeted by other states because of one's 
impact on foreign ecosystems. 
Therefore, we should expect countries 
( i )  to minimize depositions in its country, 
( i i )  to prefer the position of a "net exporter" of air pollutants over the position of 
a "net importer" of pollutants, and 
( i i i )  to minimize its exported emissions (see below). 
The goals outlined above may be partially contradictory. 
It cannot be assumed that energy policies which show unexpected impacts today - 
but were planned some 30 years ago - willfully determine a states position with respect to 
the international environmental structure as outlined below. More likely, states find 
themselves in different positions with respect to the relatively new issue of international 
environmental politics because of the incomplete foresight of previous generations of 
policy-makers. 
In the analyses to follow, four basic "scenarios" have been investigated with the 
help of RAINS. The actual situation in 1980, the Official Enerw Path 1980 ("OEP 1980"), 
was chosen as the "real world" referent case. For this year, the relevant emission data and 
the meteorological model have been developed and ~ e r i f i e d . ~  Three simulated future 
scenarios were developed: 
( i )  the Official Enerw Path 2000 (OEP 20001, a compilation of national energy 
paths by the International Energy Agency (1986) and the UNECE (1987); in 
comparison to OEP 1980, it implies no (additional) controls on emissions; 
( i i )  the Current Reductions Plan 2000 (CRP 20001, which is a set of policies 
announced by governments in response to the implementation of the 1985 
Sulphur Protocol to the 1979 UNECE Convention on the Long-Range 
Transport of Air Pollutants (UNECE 1985; compiled by the TAP staff, Amam 
1985,5);5 and 
The meteorological model is based on the combined yearly averages of 1979, 1980,1983, and 1984. 
This model was developed by EMEP; the emitter-receptor coefficients are assumed to be constant 
over time. 
Some governments announced that they will reduce sulphur emissions in excess of the 
requirements of the protocol. Other governments, like Greece, did not sign the protocol and 
anticipate increases in emissions. Both types of information are included in CRP 2000. 
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( i i i )  the Maximum Feasible Reductions 2000 scenario (MFR 2000). This scenario 
assumes that all states pursue all emission reductions which are 
"technically feasible" with the best available technology (Shaw et a1 1988, 
10; in this context it was assumed that West German technology is perfectly 
tradable internationally). 
In conclusion, three scenarios for the year 2000 represent a continuum which ranges from no 
specific policies to combat international acidification (OEP 20001, policies to be 
implemented in some countries in order to reduce environmental degradation (CRP 2000), 
and an a l l ~ u t  effort with technological means (MFR 2000). The raw matrices used in the 
analysis (Tables 1 through 4) are crosstabulations of the emitting countries (columns) with 
the depositing countries (rows). 
The raw matrices, generated by RAINS, report only integers. Although this is of no 
importance for major and medium-sized polluters, the results for Luxembourg and Albania 
seem to be susceptible to rounding error.6 Therefore, these two countries were removed from 
the analysis. The Soviet Union and Turkey, as the most westbound countries of the EMEP 
region,' have only part of their surface area incorporated in the meteorological model. 
Because relatively fewer monitoring stations are available here, our indicators, which are 
derived from the EMEP meteorological transport matrix, may be less precise in comparison 
to other countries. Indicators which take the surface area into account had been 
appropriately adjusted for the Soviet Union and Turkey. The same holds true for the 
population-based indicators involving the Soviet Union; however, the same has not been 
done yet for ~ u r k e ~ . 8  The emission data reported are not identical with official data 
provided by the UNECE (compare (i) Tables 1 and 3 with (ii) Table 5).  The Transboundary 
Air Pollution project at IIASA adjusts official data, since these data are likely to be 
misleading in some cases due to "underreporting." We suspect that there is another 
"rounding-off" problem in the MFR 2000 scenario since the amounts of sulphur involved 
have been sharply reduced. However, for large countries this should have a smaller 
impact than is the case for small countries. 
For illustration purposes, the reader may compare the error of (i) "99.4" being reported as "99" 
with (ii) "0.4" being reported as "0 .  
The author uses the geographers' definition of Europe. 
I am indebted to Ger Klaasen, formerly with the Institute for Environmental Studies, Free 
University of Amsterdam and now with the Transboundary Air Pollution Project, IIASA, for sharing 
the surface and population data for 1980 with me; Sergey Vasin, Department of Demography, 
Moscow, kindly helped me to adjust the population data of the SU. 
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3.2 The Deposition Perspective 
Taking the deposition perspective, we are interested to know the origin of an environmental 
threat. Before turning to more complicated analyses, we should have a look at the 
deposition which can be attributed to states. Table 6 gives the relevant dewsition flux of 
sulphur in g/m2/year which was computed from the raw deposition figures and the surface 
area of the country monitored by EMEP. The GDR, the CSSR, Poland, Belgium, and 
~ u n ~ a r y 9  do stand out for their relative "leadership" in deposition flux. Other factors 
held constant, these countries are the worst affected by acidification, whereas - according 
to this indicator - the Scandinavian states, Portugal, and Ireland enpy some ecological 
advantage.10 In addition, we can observe that the MFR 2000 scenario does introduce a 
substantive decline in depositions and thereby contributes to a higher degree of 
"environmental security." The change in the average depositionl1 for the GDR from 7.92 
g/m2/year (OEP 1980) to 1.41 g/m2/year (MFR 2000) especially stands out. Some countries 
can reduce their depositions drastically if MFR 2000 is implemented, while other countries 
do not have the same opportunity. Therefore, it is important to avoid "envy" in 
international negotiations on the environment: Even if all countries introduce the same 
stringent pollution controls (e.g., MFR 2000), it may not be possible for each state to achieve 
the same low level of deposition flux and therefore the same degree of environmental 
security. 
We may also shed light on the question, to what degree the deposition problem is 
"homemade", i.e., what the contributions of domestic emissions of sulphur are, and to what 
degree the problem is caused by foreign actors. Our analysis shows (Figure 2), that countries 
are often, although not always, their worst "enemy"; i.e., in most countries, domestic 
emissions are the predominant contributor to deposition. On a country-bycountry average, 
more than 40% of the deposition is caused domestically. This result holds across the four 
scenarios. 
More precisely, we can distinguish two groups with respect to domestically caused 
deposition.12 First, in the U.K. and Spain more than 80% of depositions is domestically 
caused. Second, in contrast, Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland are the 
exception from the rule that states are their foremost "enemy" (not detectable from Figure 
Country codes in the tables and figures are taken from RAlNS and reflect the international 
country codes of the automobile sign convention. 
lo Note: This analysis does not take ecosystem sensitivity into account. 
l1 For simplicity, we assume that all depositions are distributed equally across the whole country. 
Using averages just serves as a first approximation of the magnitude of the environmental 
roblem. 
P2 Since most inductive statistical methods require a sample size larger than 25, we use a simple 
procedure: Throughout this article, we focus on those groups which are about one standard 
deviation above the mean and juxtapose these states with a group of countries which is about one 
standard deviation below the mean. 
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2). With one exception, each of these countries contributes 20% or less to the deposition flux 
in their own countries. 
In order to ensure their environmental security, many countries do depend on 
collaboration with other states. However, the degree of international collaboration 
needed to achieve environmental goals varies form country to country. We can conclude 
that, on the one hand, some states basically have a domestic problem; on the other hand, 
some countries receive very substantial contribution to depositions from foreign sources. In 
order to anive at a combined concentration measure of imported and of foreign contributions, 
we developed the Dewsition Indicator for Sulphur 1 (DepIS1) 
where %wij2 is the squared percentages of country j's contribution to deposition in country i. 
The squaring of the percentage contribution to deposition is a weighting procedure ("focus"), 
which emphasizes the importance of large contributors and gives low weight to small 
contributors. The justification for this procedure is that states give disproportionate 
attention to those states which cause a major problem in country i and vice versa. We took 
the square root of the raw indicator to magnify the effect. Actually, DepISl and the 
concentration indicators to follow are simplified measures of skewness. 
The indicator DepISl may reach a maximum of 1.0 if country j contributes 100% of 
the deposition in country i;13 the lower bound is reached if all countries contribute equal 
shares, i.e., it equals W N ,  where N is the number of countries contributing to deposition. 
In our case N equals 25, so the lower bound14 is 0.20. 
This measure of focus is relatively stable for geographically large countries (data 
not presented here). Two polar groups can be distinguished by DepIS1. First, the U.K., 
Spain, and Turkey rely on a very small group of contributors. Second, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Austria rely on a relatively large number of contributing countries. These 
properties hold across scenarios. However, the domestic contribution to deposition is 
included in DepIS1. 
Students of international politics often try to measure the extent to which a country 
has influence over another country. Therefore, we wish to concentrate on imported 
depositions. The Dewsition Indicator for Sulvhur 2 (DepIS2) is a derivative of DepISl and 
excludes domestic contributions to deposition. 
l3 Recall: i may equal j. 
l4 Theoretically, the lower bound of DepISl is zero, i.e., a country has no depositions at all. 
However, this is a very unlikely case in reality. 
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The constancy of the mean score of the indicator across scenarios (data not shown here) came 
as a surprise since CRP 2000 assumes that some states undertake abatement efforts while 
other countries do not commit themselves to remedial action (see summary of total emissions 
in Table 8). On the one hand, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Switzerland, and Poland have to 
bargain only with relatively few foreign countries if they wish to reduce depositions in 
their own country. In the extreme, only one or two foreign countries are needed for 
substantial reductions; most likely, they are bordering states. On the other hand, the U.K., 
Sweden, Norway, Austria, Yugoslavia, and France would have to rely on a 
disproportionately larne number of states if they wish to reduce depositions caused by 
foreign countries. The results are mildly constant across scenarios. 
In international environmental relations, countries may threaten each other. Up to 
now, some indicators of the concentration of transboundary threats have been developed. 
Olson (1971) argues, that it is easier to find solutions for public eood problems, e.g., the 
reduction of transboundary emissions, if there are only few key members rather than a large 
group involved. This is supposed to hold, because in small groups the incentive to "free- 
ride" is reduced since each noncooperative actor may cause the non-provision of the public 
good. Therefore, we hypothesize that the more focused the international problem is for 
each country, the more likely we will find a solution for each country's international 
environmental problem. In measurement terms we are looking for higher scores on DepIS2 
rather than smaller scores. In order to capture the idea of free-riding and the magnitude of 
the environmental problem simultaneously, we use DepIS2 in conjunction with imported 
depositions per unit of surface area.15 
Following Olson, we argue that the internationalized environmental problem with 
respect to acidification is most difficult to solve for each country if it is dependent on a 
relatively large number of foreign contributors (jgi) and if the combined amounts of imports 
are very substantial. The Threat of De~osition Indicator (ThreatDepIS) reflects this idea. 
(3) Th~eatDepISi=(l-DepIS2)i x (Imported Depositionsi/Areai) 
The amount of dispersion, or the difficulty in fonning a coalition to achieve the public 
good, is expressed by the tern (1-DepIS2). This expression has an upper bound of I - d m  
and a lower bound of zero. The amount of imported depositions per unit of surface area 
l5 The control for area seems justified since, as an approximation, the magnitude of a foreign 
threat posed by a constant amount of sulphur imports varies negatively with the surface area of the 
depositing countries. 
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reflects the magnitude of the international environmental problem for each country. In 
order to achieve environmental security, countries scoring high on ThreatDepIS will have 
to "convincef' a relatively large number of states to reduce emissions. To be successful, it 
must be able to commit relatively large amounts of resources to potentially compensate 
these countries.16 
It is striking to see that only the MFR 2000 scenario (Figure 3) is able to drastically 
reduce the mean threat generated by foreign contributions to deposition. It is obvious that 
states can improve their absolute position, however, it seems unlikely, that a state can 
escape its relatively disadvantageous position within the international structure. For 
example, Austria, Belgium, the CSSR, the FRG, the GDR, and The Netherlands remain 
vulnerable relative to other states. This finding holds across scenarios. A group consisting 
of Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the U.K., and the SU shows low scores on this 
indicator. In general, none of those states with high scores on (1-DepIS2) scores high on 
ThreatDepIS. This points to the preliminary conclusion that the amount of imported 
deposition per unit of surface area is more decisive than the measure of dispersion of 
imported depositions. 
Many states in Central Europe bear the burden of having to overcome a relatively 
substantial foreign threat to their ecosystems. This group transcends categories of 
geographical size as well as type of economic system (as of late 1989). From a "problem 
pressure" perspective we expect that states scoring high on ThreatDeplS would be more 
likely to pursue agreements than states scoring low on this indicator. 
In conclusion, Central European countries are strongly and adversely affected by the 
international nature of the long-range transport of air pollutants. Rather than supporting a 
null hypothesis that states find themselves in the same structural position with respect to 
the deposition of sulphur oxides, evidence points into the opposite direction. If we are 
interested in measuring the hurdles which states have to overcome in order to reduce 
foreign deposition threats, an indicator of the dispersion of imported emission may be 
combined with the amount of sulphur imports. High scores on this indicator should point at 
states which are likely to have difficulties in limiting their outside vulnerability. These 
states should be more prone to favor multilateral negotiations over bilateral or small group 
arrangements, however, international vulnerability does not preclude the option of 
reducing domestic emissions. It has to be noted that our current investigation does not yet 
take the actual sensitivity of ecosystems to the deposition of sulphur into account. 
l6 We assume that status quo policies have achieved some legitimacy internationally. As a 
consequence, nations dissatisfied with involuntary imports of pollutants have (i) to offer 
compensation to other countries or (ii) to entertain alternative foreign policy tools to achieve 
environmental goals. 
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3 3  The International "Trade" Perspective 
In the international trade of commodities, trade balances (for the trade of goods and 
services) serve as a first approximation of a country's international performance. 
Analogously, countries import foreign emissions and export domestic emissions. Thus, a 
balanced international sulphur "account" would reveal that country i's imported 
depositions have been matched by an equal amount of (its) exported emissions.17 Net 
importers of sulphur do "internalize" an international problem, i.e., they reduce the 
international problem for the remaining countries more than they contribute to it, whereas 
net exporters do "externalize" part of their emissions. One could also say that the existence 
of international net exporters of sulphur emissions is at the heart of the creation of an 
international environmental problem: Some states take a "free ride", whereas the 
complementary set of states is in a less desirable position. 
In the two country case it holds that one country's export surplus is the other 
country's export deficit. For the case of N countries it can be shown that the sum of all trade 
deficits and trade surpluses equals zero! Applying the same logic to the international 
transport of sulphur, only those amounts of sulphur are taken into account which (i) are 
emitted by EMEP member countries and which (ii) are deposited in these countries. 
Therefore, the sum of internationally traded sulphur surpluses in the EMEP area is zero. 
Table 7 shows18 us that 17 out of 25 countries remain in a position of either a net 
exporter or a net importer across scenarios. Some countries may flip from a net exporter 
position to a net importer position, but in such case, they do not belong to the mapr actors in 
the either group. 
First, we have a look at the group of net importers, and second, we concentrate on 
the group of net exporters of sulphur. Two indicators have been developed for the net 
"imvortinp" countries. Firstly, the Import of Deposition Indicator for Sulphur 1 
(ImDepISl), is computed as the amount of net imports of sulphur from all foreign countries 
divided by the deposition of sulphur in country i. The second indicator, ImDepIS2, relates 
the net imports of sulphur to the surface area covered by country i. 
The first indicator (Figure 4) points at a group of states which internalizes the 
international ~ r o b l e m  of acidification, i.e., they partially "absorb" the international 
l7 This does not preclude that a country has a deposition problem. 
l8 A negative entry points at a net exporter position. The negative mean value for the net sulphur 
imports of OEP 1980 is caused by the exclusion of Luxembourg and Albania (see above). 
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environmental problem. This group consists of Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria 
in the first three scenarios. The second indicator (Figure 5 )  illustrates that the CRP 2000 
scenario does not necessarily lead to an improvement for all countries over OEP 2000. This is 
because some states pursue reduction plans in comparison to the OEP 2000 scenario while 
other states cling to the OEP 2000 scenario for the time being. Thereby, some countries 
reduce their own exports (via emission reductions), like Austria, while increasing the 
amount of net imports of sulphur. However, across scenarios the group comprising of 
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands shows its vulnerability to net imports 
per unit of area. 
For the "export" ~ersmctive, two similar indicators were developed. The Exmrt of 
Emission Indictor for Sulphur 1 (ExEmIS1) divides the net exports of sulphur of country i to 
all other countries j by i's level of national emissions; ExEmIS2 is defined as the amount of 
net exported emissions per 1,000 inhabitants. 
The analysis of ExEmISl (see Figure 6) clearly shows that the GDR is capable of 
externalizing her acidification problem to a substantive degree in all three scenarios for 
the year 2000, whereas Belgium and the U.K. externalize their environmental problems in 
two out of three scenarios for the year 2000. Belgium is actually the only country which can 
escape the threat it poses to other states if the MFR 2000 scenario became reality. 
With respect to ExEmIS2, the GDR also stands out as the country with the highest 
power to externalize her problem on a per capita base (see Figure 7). Hungary and the 
CSSR follow with less substantive threats in two out of three scenarios for the year 2000. 
Regardless of the indicator chosen, the GDR, Hungary, the CSSR, Belgium, and the U.K. 
remain leading states which externalize an environmental problem. 
The previous analyses showed that, as far as acid pollution is concerned, we have a 
set of net externalizers and a set of net internalizers. Some small countries, like Norway, 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, find themselves in an internalizing 
position. This finding holds if we control for the size of surface area. The GDR is capable 
of externalizing her acidification problem regardless of the indicator chosen, whereas 
Belgium, the U.K., the CSSR, and Hungary show minor changes in their their rank order 
across the export indicators. 
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3.4 The International Emission Perspective 
Rather than looking at international environmental problems from a victim's perspective 
or an international trade perspective, governments might wish to avoid to be politically 
targeted by other countries. This amounts to asking: What is the threat posed to other 
countries j by ips emissions? Rather than letting j's government point at i's country, officials 
in i may wish to (i) anticipate their strategic position and (ii) to conclude that some sort of 
policy is asked for in order to circumvent foreign policy problems. From this perspective 
follows that we have to focus on threats by exported emissions. 
In the following analyses we will interpret only one scenario as long as no physical 
quantities of sulphur are directly involved in the computation of the indicators. I.e., the 
concentration indicators for emissions will not vary with the level of emissions since a fixed 
emission-transport-deposition matrix is underlying these calculations in RAINS. However, 
once we start to use indicators which combine concentration indices with amounts of sulfur 
deposited abroad (like ThreatEmISl, see below), scores for each country will vary across 
scenarios. 
If we look at the total emissions of sulphur (see Table 81, the SU, the GDR, the 
U.K., Poland, and the CSSR would stand out regardless of the scenario chosen. Since we 
focus on the international part of the problem we have to compute those exported emissions 
which will be deposited in other EMEP countries. The pecking order does change, with the 
GDR leading Poland, the CSSR, and the FRG in most scenarios (data not shown here). This 
change in hierarchy can not only be explained by (i) limiting the analysis to the study of 
the international aspect of the problem but also by (ii) differences in the amounts of sulphur 
which cannot be allocated to political entities on the receptor' side. 
As mentioned above, emissions may pose a problem for one's own country as well as 
to foreign countries. Roughly 50% of the accountable emissions are dewsited on domestic 
ecosvstems. As shown in section 3.2, states turn out be their own predominant adversary. 
However, the degree of domestic threat varies by country (see Figure 8): The Soviet Union 
and Turkey deposit roughly 80% and more of their emissions domestically.19 The 
Mediterranean countries of Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy follow in the 60%-70% range 
whereas Sweden and Norway deposit between 54% and 58% of their emissions 
domestically. On the other hand, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Denmark deposit 
between 20% and 30% on their own countries. Figure 8 shows that the Central European 
countries pose domestic threats to their populations below or at the mean level. 
Only 50% of total emissions can be allocated as depositions to political entities 
within the EMEP area (data not shown here). The remaining 50% of emissions are either 
l9 Recall, that only the western parts of these countries are included in the EMEP monitoring area, 
and limited monitoring makes the scores for these countries susceptible to error. 
Detlef Sprinz 
deposited outside the EMEP area, contribute to background deposition in the EMEP area, or 
they are deposited on the high seas. Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Norway, and Spain, 
display higher levels of emissions which cannot be accounted for in comparison to a group of 
states comprising of Hungary, the GDR, Poland, the FRG, Yugoslavia, and Austria. Thus, 
Central European countries are disproportionately at a disadvantage from an emission 
perspective, because monitoring holds them more accountable for their emissions than is the 
case for other countries. 
In analogy to section 4.2, we look at the focus (or concentration) of the emission 
stemming from each country i. The Emission Indicator for Sul~hur  1 (EmISl) is defined as 
where %wij is the % distribution of emissions aaoss all countries (i.e., including domestic 
deposition). The higher the score on EmISl, the smaller the number of countries which 
receive emissions from state i; therefore, country i will be exposed to pressure from fewer 
countries as the xore on E d 1  increases. 
The group of countries consisting of the SU, Turkey, the Iberian countries, Finland 
and Norway show particularly highly focused emissions, while the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, the CSSR, Hungary, Denmark, and the GDR display disproportionately 
low levels of focused emissions (data not shown here). 
The indicator EmIS2 only takes into account emissions deposited abroad. 
Portugal, Finland, and Ireland are expected to have only few foes, because only a small 
number of countries receive their emissions, whereas the FRG, the SU, the U.K., Italy, 
France, Yugoslavia, and Austria do pollute a wider array of countries (data not shown 
here). From an emission perspective, one should expect to find international resistance to 
country i if (i) its emissions are focused and if (ii) the amount of sulphur exported are high. 
The indicator of the Threat of Emissions Indicator for Sulvhur 1 (ThreatEmIS1) combines 
theses two components. 
(1 0) Threa tEmISli=EmIS2i x Exported Emissionsi [i=l, ..., j ,.., N] 
It turns out (see Figure 9) that the mid-sized East European economies of Poland, the GDR, 
the CSSR, and Romania are capable to pose foreign threats primarily because of high 
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amounts of exported emissions. This result holds across scenarios. The FRG is capable of 
reducing its foreign policy vulnerability with the help of its current reduction plans, 
whereas the U.K., supposedly the "enfant terrible" for many countries, does not occupy a 
leading position on this threat indicator. On the other end of the spectrum, we find 
Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Ireland, and Austria. This group comprises of relatively 
advanced as well as less advanced economies; however all of them belong to the group of 
"small states" (see section 4) in world politics. Our finding about the East European 
economies is corroborated, if we introduce the Threat of Emissions Indicator for Sulphur 2 
which controls ThreatEmISl for population size: 
The factor 1,000 is solely introduced for the convenience of readability. On the one hand, 
the GDR, the CSSR, Hungary, and Poland are able to threaten other states across scenarios 
(see Figure 10). On the other hand, one can attribute only small international 
environmental threats to the SU and Turkey in all three scenarios for the year 2000, 
whereas Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland find themselves in the same position in the 
OEP 2000 and CRF 2000 scenarios. It has to be mentioned that the CRP 2000 and MFR 2000 
scenarios succeed in substantially reducing the mean threat. 
In conclusion, we found that states threaten themselves to a substantial degree. The 
medium range countries on the focus variable EmIS2 (GDR, CSSR, Hungary, Poland) are 
likely to pose substantial threats through international emissions to other EMEP countries 
because of the magnitude of exported emissions (GDR, CSSR, Poland). From an emission 
perspective, we do expect these three countries to be at the core of the problem of sulphur- 
based acidification in the European member states of the UNECE. 
4. Theoretical Implications of the Findings and an Agenda far Future Research 
This concluding section will summarize and integrate our findings, point at potential 
methodological improvements, and reinterprets some world politics terminology in view of 
our findings. 
A short look at Table 9 highlights two interesting clusters of states: (i) a group of 
"small countries", which find themselves in a disadvantageous position, and (ii) a group of 
East European countries. 
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With respect to the deposition perspective, "small" states, defined as states which 
cannot influence their environmental vulnerability to a substantial degree120 find 
themselves either in an exposed position or in a "safe" position. Austria and the 
Netherlands appear to be quite vulnerable, which is not true for Finland, Ireland, and 
Portugal. However, a set of small countries comprising Sweden, Norway, Austria, 
Switzerland are net internalizers of the internationalized problem of acidification ("trade 
perspective"), and they do not cause substantial international threats with their emissions. 
Although the GDR and the CSSR find themselves threatened from a deposition 
perspective, they are able to externalize part of their international problem. Together 
with Poland, these countries are likely to face demands from other countries for 
ameliorative action. However, we shall not assume that these countries will undertake 
drastic policies to combat their domestic or international problem, because it is unlikely 
that Eastern European countries can easily afford it on their own. 
This paper developed some indictors of international environmental threats 
involving transboundary acid pollution. Future analyses will include acidification caused 
by nitrogen oxides. The TAP project at IIASA is currently updating the relevant database. 
In the future, the author will undertake additional analyses in order to see (i) how close our 
indicators are related to each other and (ii) to what degree they form separate dimensions. 
In addition, indicators will be developed, which summarize the domestic and international 
problem of acidification for each country. Ecosystem sensitivity measures will be 
incorporated in order to more accurately define international vulnerability; furthermore, 
indicators of the costs for specific policy scenarios will have to be incorporated in the 
analysis. Then we may determine the range of possible political outcomes (see Stam et a1 
1989). 
This analysis also taught us some lessons for international relations theorv. The 
term "international interdewndence" (Keohane/Nye 1977) certainly does not point to 
mutual dependence of the 25 countries of Europe. Quite to the contrary, countries are often 
only dependent on their immediate neighbors, and the extent of dependence varies with (i) 
the amount to which the problem is domestically caused and with (ii) the country-specific 
emitter-receptor matrix. Foreign policies and domestic policies are therefore related. In 
order to achieve environmental security, governments have to persuade domestic and 
foreign polluters. 
Furthermore, the international aspect of the acidification problem cannot be 
derived from a transitivity property of the international system: If i depends on j, and if j 
depends on k, transitivity postulates that i will depend on k. However, this is unlikely to 
be the case with transboundary acidification. Instead, we should think of this 
20 In international trade theory, small economies are price-takers, whereas large economies can 
influence the terms4f-trade. 
environmental problem as a set of "overlavvine umbrellas": Each state tries to protect itself 
with an umbrella. Since each country tries to do so (although umbrella quality does vary 
with the degree of environmental quality preferred), all of Europe is covered by umbrellas. 
However, umbrellas are put up at different heights so as to display different degrees of 
willingness to solve the problem. Some clusters of umbrellas are put higher because a 
country is advantaged by its relative, structural position (less vulnerability), or because it 
has less preferences for a safe environment. Other clusters of umbrellas are located closer to 
the earth's surface and symbolize strong preferences for environmental protection. Domestic 
politics has to be incorporated in the analysis, since it might be an important factor in 
determining where nations put their umbrellas (see Figure 1). 
What is the role of international oreanizations with regard to regulating acid 
pollution? One country may be interested in bribing another country because this can be the 
least costly method for reducing depositions in one's country (i.e., "bring its umbrella closer 
to the earth's surface"). International organizations may be able to fine-tune the 
arrangement of the umbrellas so as to find efficient sets of coordinated umbrella 
configurations. Thus, economic efficiency might be supported through the foundation of a 
"common fund". This fund would possibly be established so as to finance European clean-up 
efforts through disproportionately large contributions from the 'West" and relatively 
small contributions from the "East". However, it shall not be overlooked that there might 
be strong incentives for some countries not to give to all other countries equally but to assure 
one's own national environmental security. The larger the sums involved, the more likely 
we will find influential donators to tie their help to specific emission reductions in 
countries of their choice21. Assuming the "West" wishes to "buy" environmental security, it 
is likely that it will not care much for the problem of achieving similar deposition goals in 
some Eastern European countries ("common environmental security") because of the enormous 
costs involved. Rather than showing benevolence, we could (but not have to) find that the 
international negotiations process will coordinate institutionalized international bribery 
between clusters of states, and international organizations simply serve as a forum for rule 
interpretation, "political" litigation, administration of the fund, and "soft" enforcement of 
the agreements. Actually, it could be interesting for the "West" to coordinate its bribing 
efforts so as to achieve their environmental goal in the least expensive way. This assumes 
that the West European countries will be able to overcome national egoisms which is the 
more likely, the more similar the "Western" countries are with respect to their position 
within the international environmental structure. 
Self-helv in the international environmental system is unlikely to include force, 
because it is foreign energy policies, foreign transportation policies, etc., which a state may 
wish to change. The "vower" of a country, or her "influence", would be expressed as its 
21 This phenomenon can partially be observed with debt-for-nature swaps (Page 1989). 
De tlef Sprinz 17 
capacity to determine other countries' energy policy. Unlike in the sphere of military 
security, the willingness and the capability to transfer resources to other countries (or to 
offer alternative kinds of compensation) is a necessary condition for country j's might. Only 
few states are likely to be able do this. 
The international environmental system with regard to the acidification problem 
in Europe is asymmetrical. Clusters of states can be distinguished, and international 
organizations might be helpful in achieving environmental goals more cost-efficiently. 
However, I suspect that the problem at hand gives states incentives to solve problems 
unilaterally or in small groups. Although the pecking order within the international 
environmental structure might be very stable, coordinated remedial action will lead to a 
reduction of the environmental threat to all countries in Europe. 
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SF 
F 
D 
DD A 
GR 
H 
IRL 
1 
L 
N L 
N 
PC 
P 
R 
E 
S 
CH 
TR 
UK 
SU 
YU 
A L A B  BG 
7 0 0 3  
0 3 2 2 1  
0  0  4 8 0  
1  1  0  126 
0  14 4  1  
0 0 2 0  
0 0 1 1  
0  3  49 2  
0 9 4 7 1  
0 2 9 0  
4 0 0 2 8  
0 9 1 2  
0 0 1 0  
1 6 3 3  
0 0 2 0  
0  0  24 0  
0 0 3 1  
0 6 8 2  
0 0 0 0  
0 2 1 2 6  
0 1 2 1  
0  1 4  1  
0 2 2 0  
o o i m  
0 0 8 1  
1 7 1 1 2 7  
6  12 2  42 
CK SF F D D D R C R  H IRL I L N L N  R P  R E S l R U K S U Y U  
0 0 1 1 1 4 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 4  
0 0 1 3 2 4 2 4 0 1 9 0 2 9 0 1  0 1 5 0 2 2 0 2 0 5 4  16 
0  0  4 5 3 5 4  0  0  0  1 1  1 0 0  1 0  0  1 0  0  0  1 5 1  0  
0 0 1 2 5 6 7 0 4 0 0 0 7 0 3 5 1 0 0 3 2 1 1 1 1  
1 0  1 4 3 9 1 4 1 0  6 4 0  1 1 0  2  0  1 3 5 0  5  2  0  1 0  9  6  10 
2 2 0  3  1 3 1 3 0  1 0  1 0  2  0  5  0  0  0  3  0  0  1 1 2  0  
2  7 9 3  6  1 2 0  2  0  2  0  1 1  1 1 0  1 2  1 0 0  0  7  6 7 1  
1 1  5 5 8 7 3 3 6 1  6  2  5 9 2  9 0  1 5 1  2  7 6 1  8  1 7 6 1 8 4  
6  0  1 1 6 4 W 1 5 6 1  8  1 2 4 2  2 6 0  2 6 0  2  7  1 6  0  5 9 9  5  
4  0  1 8 9 6 5 1 8 0  4  0  5  0  5  0  3 9 0  1 1  1 0  0  1 9 4  2  
0 0 2 2 3 7 9 3 0 7 0 0 0 3 0 4 2 0 0 3 1 5 5  
0  0  5  7  1 6 1  1 7 3 0  1 4 0  0  0  2 2 0  1 8 1  0  0  0  3  4 32 
0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 9 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 3 0  
0 0 3 5 1 4 1 3 3 1 0 0 5 S r l 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 3 0 6 1  8 1 0 1 7  
0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  
0  0  1 4 5 9 6  0  1 0  1 0  2 4 0  2  0  0  1 0  0  0  2 0 1  0  
6  2  7  1 2 1 9 1  2  1 4  0  2  1 4 1 1 0  1 3  8  0  1 2 2 2 0 1  
7  1 1 8 5 8 3 0 5 1  3 5 0  1 1 0  5  0  6 3 0 0  8  2  3  0  1 2 3 2 3 9  
0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 6 0 1 8 0 0 0 2 3 0  
1 0 5 8 2 3 3 . 5 6 0 1 2 0 1  0 3 7 0  2 3 3 2 0 0 2 5 3 4 3 0  
0 0 3 5 8 8 1  2 0 8 0 1  0 5 1 0 1 4 1 5 0 0 1  1 2 1 0 1  
2 1 1 0 1 0 2 3 4 0 1  4  0  5  0  3  7  2 7 0  2  3  5 9 0  1 2 4 2 5 2  
0 0 2 3 1 0 5 0 1 0 5 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 4 2 1  
0 0 3 3 5 1 3 4 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 6 2 0 0 9 7 3 2 2 3  
1 0  2 3 1 3 1 0 0  1 8  3  0  4  0 5  0  1 5  1 0  0  5 2 8 7  1  
14 47 33 70 185 9  74 1  35 0  7  2 291 1  95 17 18 1  10 57 2142 25 
1 0  1 2 1 2 2 1 7  6 8 0  R O  1 0 2 1 0  2 7 5  0  1 2  6  1 3 1 8 2  
Unib: Annual Sdepcrsition in Idlotom 
So--or mahices d A v e n g  of tot1979, td1980, totl983, tot1964 
Data were de~ived from the &gional Acidification and flrlformation and Simulation model (RAINS) developed by the International lmtitute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (we Alcamo et a1 1968). 
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I a k U  Cumnt Reduction Plua  2000 (CRP EcXl) 
UN~:  Annual Sdepmition in kilotons 
Sourrereceptor mrtriccs used: Average of totl979, tot1980, tot1983, tot1984 
Data were derived from the Regional Acidification and rnforxxution and Simulation d d  (RAWS) developed by the International Institute for Applied Systens Analysis (IIASA) (see Alcamo et a1 1988). 
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A L A  B B G G D K T F  D D L X C R H  I R L I  L N L N R P  R E S a i T R U K S U Y U  
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  
0 6 0 0 7 0 0 1 3 4 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 7  
0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  
0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 9 0 0 0 2 0 2 5  
0 3 0 0 5 8 0 0 1 5 2 5 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5  
0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 2 0  
0 4 0 4 0 0 5 ( 1 0 7 0 1 0 5 0 1 0 4 0 1 0 0 3 1 9 3 2  
0  2  4  0  I 2  0  1 1 5 5 2 8 0  2  0  2  0  4  0  8  0  0  0  2  0 . 7  2  2  
0 0 1 0 2 4 0 0 2 1 3 9 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 ~  
2 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 2  
0 2 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 9 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  
0 1 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 2 2 0 ~ 0 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 3 1 1 2 8  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0  
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 1  
Units: Annual Sdepmition in kilotom 
Source-receptor matrices used: Avmge of tot1979, td1980, totl983, tot1984 
Data were derived from the Egional fidification and m f m t i o n  and Simulation modd (RAINS) developed by the Intemationd h t i t u t e  for Applied Systems A ~ l y s i s  (IIASA) (see h o  et a1 1988). 
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Table 5: Emission Data for OEP 1980 and CRP 2000 
(As Published by the UNECE) 
source: UNECE 1989,7 
Note: All entries are integers, expressed in kt of sulphur 
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Table 6; Deposition of SulphurIArea [g/m2/year] 
Mean I 2.49 I 2.43 I 1.94 I 0.44 
S.D. 1.91 1.70 1.31 0.36 
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m1e 7; Net Sulphur Imports by Country [kt Slyearl 
Note: Negative entries l~flect a net exporter position. 
Mean 
S.D. 
- 1 I 0 I 0 I 0 
261 262 I 226 1 55 
Detlef Sprinz 30 
D b l e  B; Total Emissions of Sulphur [kt Slyearl (Computed by RAINS) 
Min 
Max 
Mean 
S.D. 
64 
6476 
1081 
1367 
52 
6462 
1096 
1319 
32 
4534 
887 
990 
16 
1128 
199 
243 
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W 1 e  9: Summary of Findings 
Indicator 
Depositions 
ThreatDepIS 
International Trade 
ImDepISl 
ImDepIS2 
ExEmISl 
ExEmIS2 
Emissions 
ThreatEmISl 
ThreatEmIS2 
Vulnerable Countries 
Vulnerable Countries 
A, B, CS, D, 
DDR, NL 
Internalizing Countries 
N, CH, S, A 
NL, CH, S, A 
-- 
-- 
Vulnerable Countries 
DDR, PL, CS 
DDR, CS, H, PL 
Not Vulnerable Countries 
Not Vulnerable Countries 
SF, IRL, P, E 
TR, UK 
Externalizing Countries 
- 
- 
DDR, B, UK 
DDR, H, CS 
Not Vulnerable Countries 
S, N, P, IRL, A 
SU, TR, S, N, CH 
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Ficure 5: Net Internalization of International Acidification - ImDepIS2 [g/m2/yearl 
(adjusted for surface area) 
0.00 
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Figure 7: Net Externalization of International Acidification - ExEmIS2 
(adjusted for population size in 1980) 
OEP 1980 OEPZNO 
-.____.__._________.....____.____._______ - 1 . 1 1 1 - I . a . -  
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A B BG CS DK SF F D DDRGR H IRL I NL N PL P R E S CH TR UK SU YU 
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Figure 8: % Domestic Threat Through National Emissions 
(OEP 1980) 
0 
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Ficure 10: Threat from Exported Emissions - ThreatEmIS2 
(adjusted for population size in 1980) 
OEP 1980 H OEP2000 CRP2000 MFR 2000 
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